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AFTER THE REVOLUTION: EGYPT’S CHANGING FORMS OF
CORRUPTION
M. PATRICK YINGLING AND MOHAMED A. ‘ARAFA
ABSTRACT:
Egypt’s revolution of January 25, 2011 was impelled by a desire to
eliminate “conventional corruption,” a particular kind of corruption that
occurs when government officials illegally abuse public office for
private gain. Illegal quid pro quo transactions, including acts of
bribery, are prominent examples of conventional corruption. This form
of corruption is to be contrasted with “unconventional corruption,” a
form of corruption that has (thus far) been absent in Egypt.
Unconventional corruption occurs when elected officials put personal
campaign finances ahead of the public interest without engaging in a
quid pro quo transaction. These different forms, conventional and
unconventional corruption, are not necessarily exhaustive of the
universe of corruption. However, classification of corruption in these
terms serves a purpose: when conventional corruption decreases, there
is often a correlating increase in unconventional corruption. This
relationship is relevant for purposes of analyzing corruption in Egypt
because Egypt’s new constitution, although imperfect, provides for
greater restraints on executive power, and thus, in turn provides a
foundation for a reduction in conventional corruption. However, as a
result, problems of unconventional corruption are likely to emerge.
Fortunately, unconventional corruption is not an inevitable side effect
of progress—it can be contained. With a certain bit of insight and
courage, the people of Egypt can reform their campaign finance system
and bring forth a true democracy—one where elected officials make
decisions not for the benefit of potential political funders, but rather, for
the benefit of the people.
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When a republic has been corrupted, none of the ills that arise can be
remedied except by removing the corruption and recalling the
principles; every other correction is either useless or a new ill.
- Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws

I.

INTRODUCTION

Egypt’s revolution of January 25, 2011 was the result of many
factors. One factor was government corruption. More specifically, it
was “conventional corruption,” which occurs when government
officials illegally abuse public office for private gain. Illegal quid pro
quo transactions, including acts of bribery, are prominent examples of
conventional corruption. This form of corruption is to be contrasted
with “unconventional corruption,” a form of corruption that has (thus
far) been absent in Egypt. Unconventional corruption occurs when
elected officials put personal campaign finances ahead of the public
interest. Although unconventional corruption does not involve an
illegal quid pro quo transaction, it does involve corrupt decisionmaking that is undertaken with the purpose of serving political funders
instead of the people.
Unconventional corruption, in contrast to its conventional
counterpart, is not always recognized as a form of corruption. Thus,
unconventional corruption requires a more detailed explanation. The
unconventional corrupt act is not the spending of money by private
parties. Rather, it is the elected official’s decision to act with the
purpose of inducing such spending by private parties. Unconventional
corruption is not a problem of gratitude; it is problem of incentive—the
wrong incentive. Instead of making decisions with the incentive of
serving the public interest, elected officials make decisions with the
incentive of benefiting from future campaign contributions and
expenditures.
These different forms, conventional and unconventional
corruption, are not necessarily exhaustive of the universe of corruption.
Nonetheless, classification of corruption in these terms serves a
purpose due to their shared relationship—when conventional corruption
decreases, there is a correlating increase in unconventional corruption.
One aspect of this relationship involves the increased supply of
campaign contributions and expenditures from private parties: when
conventional corruption decreases and bribe offering because less
effective, campaign contributions and expenditures become alternative
tools of influence. Another aspect of this relationship involves the
27
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increased demand for campaign contributions and expenditures from
elected officials: when measures to combat conventional corruption are
implemented and elected officials can no longer illegally steal elections
or divert public monies to fund their campaigns, such officials become
eager to benefit from contributions and expenditures. Thus, once a
country takes concrete steps to reduce conventional corruption, it must
then focus on combating unconventional corruption.
This article analyzes conventional and unconventional
corruption in the context of Egypt’s remarkable past, its tumultuous
present, and its hopeful future. Part I elaborates on the concepts of
conventional and unconventional corruption. Part II catalogs Egypt’s
history of conventional corruption.
Part III describes Egypt’s
revolution of January 25, 2011 as well as the uprising of June 30, 2013,
which has been described as a revolution, counter-revolution, and/or
military coup d’état. Part IV analyzes Egypt’s new constitution and its
potential impact on conventional corruption. Part V explains why
Egypt could experience a rise in unconventional corruption. Part VI
details what can be done to combat a rise in unconventional corruption.

II.

CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL
CORRUPTION

Government corruption is commonly defined as the abuse of
1
public office for private gain. Within this broad definition, corruption
The content of this article is current as of January 1, 2014. This
article was presented at the International Law Weekend Conference at
Fordham University School of Law on a panel titled “Towards a
Culture of Accountability: A New Dawn for Egypt” on October 27,
2012 and at the ASCL Younger Comparativists Committee New
Voices in Comparative Law Conference at Indiana University Robert
H. McKinney School of Law on April 19, 2013. The authors thank
Ronald Brand, Ahmed Eldakak, Haider Ala Hamoudi, and Ian
Hartshorn for reviewing earlier drafts of this article. The views
expressed, along with any errors, are to be attributed only to the
authors.
1
Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of
International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 793, 802-03 (2001) (“Professor [Bruce] Gronbeck,
a linguist gave a straightforward definition, that ‘the term political
corruption’ encompasses those acts whereby private gain is made at
public expense.’ Professor [Abraham] Eisenstadt, a historian, offered a
28
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exists in different forms.
One specific form is “conventional
corruption,” which occurs when government officials illegally abuse
2
public office for private gain.
Illegal quid pro quo transactions,
3
including acts of bribery, are examples of conventional corruption.
Perhaps the most notorious form of conventional corruption is the
4
illegal theft of an election.
Conventional corruption can be further broken down into two
5
basic kinds: grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand corruption
involves theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by
6
government officials. This kind of corruption most often originates
with high-level officials who recognize and exploit opportunities that
7
are presented through government work. Petty corruption, on the
other hand, involves isolated transactions by lower-level administrative
bureaucrats who abuse their office by demanding bribes, diverting
8
public funds, or awarding favors in return for personal considerations.
Although the individual corrupt transactions within a government’s
bureaucratic cholesterol usually involve very little money, such

similar description, that ‘[p]olitical corruption means that a public
official has perverted the office entrusted to his care, that he has broken
a public trust for private gain.’”); FAQs on Corruption,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruptio
n#defineCorruption (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
2
M. Patrick Yingling, Conventional and Unconventional Corruption,
51 DUQ. L. REV. 263, 266 (2013).
3
Id.
4
See id. at 273-74.
5
Id. at 266.
6
Anwar Shah, Tailoring the Fight Against Corruption to Country
Circumstances, in PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMBATING
CORRUPTION 233, 235 (Anwar Shah ed., 2007).
7
James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Expanding the
Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption
Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 407, 412 (1999); Kimberly
Ann Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview
and Recommendations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
175, 178 (1997),
http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/12/10ie2334.pdf.
8
Gathii, supra note 7, at 412; Elliott, supra note 7, at 178.
29
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transactions can, in the aggregate, involve a substantial amount of
9
public resources.
In contrast to conventional corruption, “unconventional
corruption” occurs when elected officials put personal campaign
10
finances ahead of the public interest.
Because it involves elected
officials, unconventional corruption is unique to democratic forms of
11
government —at least in so far as corrupt governments can be
12
classified as true democracies. Although frequently overlooked, this
form of government corruption involves a decision-making process that
13
can corrupt a democracy to its core.
Unconventional corruption is not necessarily illegal; many
statutory prohibitions on “corruption” do not reach unconventionally
14
corrupt acts.
And, although academics sometimes define
Shah, supra note 6, at 231.
Yingling, supra note 2, at 264, 267.
11
Id. at 267.
12
See Juliet Sorensen, Ideals Without Illusions: Corruption and the
Future of a Democratic North Africa, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 202,
203 (2012) (“The absence of corruption alone does not engender
democracy, but true democracy cannot exist where corruption
thrives.”).
13
Yingling, supra note 2, at 270.
14
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2006) (“Whoever . . . being a public
official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly,
corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or
accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in
return for: (A) being influenced in the performance of any official act;
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in,
or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any
fraud, on the United States; or (C) being induced to do or omit to do
any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person . . .
shall be fined under this title or not more than three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for
not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from
holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”)
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of
California, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) (“[F]or bribery, there must be
a quid pro quo – a specific intent to give or receive something of value
in exchange for an official act.”).
9

10
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15

“corruption” to involve illegal activity, and courts sometimes assume
that government power can only be corrupted through quid pro quo
16
transactions, government corruption, as described here, does not
17
require illegal activity or a quid pro quo transaction. Indeed, perhaps
the most elusive and counterproductive form of corruption in some
transition and developed countries is the unconventional form, which is
18
often legal and does not require a coordinated agreement.
The underlying problem of unconventional corruption does
not concern secret deals entered into pre-election. Rather, the problem
19
concerns incentives that are offered post-election.
Similarly, the
problematic effect of unconventional corruption is not necessarily expost in that elected officials take a position on a particular issue
because of past contributions and expenditures.
Instead, the
problematic effect is ex-ante in that incumbent elected officials take a
position on a particular issue with the hopes of benefiting from future
20
contributions and expenditures.
Elected officials know of past

See, e.g., ROBIN THEOBALD, CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 15 (1990) (recognizing the difficulties in
defining corruption but ultimately concluding that corruption is best
defined as “the illegal use of public office for private gain”); Jakob
Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 20
(Summer 2005) (“A common definition of public corruption is the
misuse of public office for private gain. Misuse, of course, typically
involves applying a legal standard.”); cf. RALPH KETCHUM, FRAMED
FOR POSTERITY 58 (1993) (stating that the universally understood
meaning of “corruption” is “the opposite of the public good”).
16
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010)
(interpreting the U.S. Constitution and finding a government interest in
combating only “quid pro quo corruption”).
17
Henning, supra note 1, at 794 (“At a fundamental level, the term
‘corruption’ does not denote any particular transgression, and need not
even be conduct that would constitute a crime.”).
18
Yingling, supra note 2, at 268.
19
Id. (citing Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, in MONEY,
POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 119, 124
(Monica Youn ed., 2011)).
20
Yingling, supra note 2, at 268.
15
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contributions and the possibility of future ones from the interested
21
parties.
There is a coherent and sensible argument to be made that
money in the form of campaign contributions and expenditures merely
buys speech that helps persuade voters to side with one candidate over
another, and that private campaign contributions and expenditures are
essential for a properly functioning democracy. The problem of
unconventional corruption, however, is not about what the money does.
Rather, it is about what has to be done in order to secure the money.
The money does not necessarily contradict democratic principles.
What must be done to secure the money, however, can corrupt a
22
democracy to its core.
Although unconventional corruption has, thus far, not been a
factor that has hampered Egyptians’ pursuit of democracy, this form of
corruption is not merely theoretical; it exists in various countries, and
23
one in particular: the United States.
There are a number of policy
issues that perpetually go unsolved in the United States due to
unconventional corruption. These unsolved issues include a financial
24
system composed of irrational incentives, nutrition standards that
25
promote obesity, and firearms laws (or lack thereof) that fail to reflect
26
the public will.
These unsolved issues are not necessarily the result
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 121 (2011) (citing Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 325 (1989)).
22
Yingling, supra note 2, at 270 (citing LESSIG, supra note 21, at 16162).
23
Yingling, supra note 2, at 286-90.
24
Id. at 286-88 (citing LESSIG, supra note 21, at 188-89).
25
Yingling, supra note 2, at 288-89.
26
Frank Newport, Americans Wanted Gun Background Checks to Pass
Senate, GALLUP (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162083/americans-wanted-gunbackground-checks-pass-senate.aspx (“Sixty-five percent of Americans
say the U.S. Senate should have passed the measure that would have
expanded background checks for gun purchases, while 29% agree with
the Senate’s failure to pass the measure.”); Votes on Manchin-Toomey
Amendment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, Apr. 18, 2013,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/issues/guns/vote_2013.php (last
visited Sept. 14, 2013) (“On April 17th, 2013, members of the US
21
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of backward morals or conventional corruption, such as bribery; rather,
they are the result of unconventional corruption—elected officials
making decisions with the purpose of being rewarded (in a non-quid
pro quo fashion) with future campaign financing, regardless of whether
the elected officials believe those decisions to be in the public interest.
Thus, in the United States, unconventional corruption is, perhaps
27
ironically, not so unconventional.
These different forms, conventional and unconventional
corruption, are not exhaustive of the universe of corruption. For
example, academics often consider nepotism (or wasta, as loosely
28
translated in Arabic) to be a form of corruption.
However, unless
acts of nepotism are accomplished through a public official’s illegal
act, they are neither acts of conventional nor unconventional
Senate voted on the Manchin-Toomey amendment, which would have
required background checks on all commercial sales of guns. The vote
failed, with 54 members in support and 46 in opposition. Nearly all of
the members who voted against the amendment have received
substantial amounts of money from the political action committees of
gun rights groups, including the National Rifle Association.”).
27
Yingling, supra note 2, at 267-68 (“The label ‘unconventional’ does
not imply that this form of corruption occurs less frequently than
conventional corruption; instead, the label ‘unconventional’ reflects the
fact that because acts of unconventional corruption are not necessarily
illegal, courts and academics often assume that government power can
only be corrupted through traditionally illegal activities, such as quid
pro quo transactions.”).
28
See, e.g., Phillip M. Nichols, George J. Siedel, Matthew Kasdin,
Corruption as a Pan-Cultural Phenomenon: An Empirical Study in
Countries at Opposite Ends of the Former Soviet Empire, 39 TEX.
INT’L L. J. 215, 244 (2004) (citing SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1978)) (referring to
nepotism as a form of corruption); JOHN R. BRADLEY, INSIDE EGYPT:
THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS 154-55
(2012) (discussing wasta under a chapter on “corruption”); see also
Lawrence Rosen, Understanding Corruption, THE AMERICAN
INTEREST, at 82 (Spring 2010), http://www.the-americaninterest.com/pdf/v5/n4/Rosen.pdf (quoting ROBERT B. CUNNINGHAM &
YASIN K. SARAYAH, WASTA: THE HIDDEN FORCE IN THE MIDDLE
EASTERN SOCIETY 1, 4, 6 (1993) (opining that “wasta includes, but is
broader than, corruption” and that some wasta acts are legal while
others are illegal)).
33
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corruption.
Despite their combined non-exhaustive nature,
classification of corruption in these terms serves a purpose due to their
shared relationship—when conventional corruption decreases, there is a
29
correlating increase in unconventional corruption. One aspect of this
relationship involves the increased supply of campaign contributions
and expenditures from private parties: when conventional corruption
decreases and bribe offering becomes less effective, contributions and
30
expenditures become alternative tools of influence.
Another aspect
of this relationship involves the increased demand for campaign
contributions and expenditures from elected officials: when measures
to combat conventional corruption are implemented and elected
officials can no longer illegally steal elections or divert public monies
to fund their campaigns, such officials become eager to obtain
31
campaign contributions and expenditures.
Therefore, as is argued
32
below in our country-specific analysis of Egypt, once a country takes
concrete steps to reduce conventional corruption, it must then focus on
33
combating unconventional corruption.

III.

THE HISTORY OF CONVENTIONAL CORRUPTION
IN EGYPT

After years of perceived corruption and injustice under British
34
occupation, Egypt, in 1919, started a move to independence with
Muslims and Christian Copts joining forces to instigate a popular
35
revolution. This uprising resulted in nominal independence for Egypt
Yingling, supra note 2, at 270-71.
See Nauro F. Campos and Francesco Giovannoni, Lobbying,
Corruption, and Political Influence, 131 PUB. CHOICE 1, 2-3 (2007)
(finding that lobbying activities, which include campaign contributions
and expenditures, are an important alternative tool of influence when
bribe offering becomes less effective).
31
Yingling, supra note 2, at 270-71.
32
See infra Parts V & VI.
33
Yingling, supra note 2, at 271.
34
See TAREK OSMAN, EGYPT ON THE BRINK, FROM NASSER TO
MUBARAK 24-25 (2010); BRUCE K. RUTHERFORD, EGYPT AFTER
MUBARAK: LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB
WORLD 35 (new introduction ed. 2012) (discussing corruption in Egypt
under British occupation).
35
Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, Towards a Culture for Accountability: A New
Dawn for Egypt, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 1, 8 (2011); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
29
30
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in 1922, which was followed by the first post-independence
36
constitution in 1923.
With the implementation of the constitution,
Egypt became a constitutional monarchy in which certain executive
powers were held by the government, which was answerable to a
37
nationally elected parliament.
Under the constitutional monarchy, Egypt experienced
economic development through advances in industry and infrastructure,
38
as well as through exposure to international markets.
However, the
benefits of such development were generally confined to the wealthiest
members of Egyptian society; the country’s middle class grew at a very
39
slow pace. As Egyptians became more aware of this situation, King
Farouk, the head of the Egyptian state, became ensnared in multiple
40
incidents of conventional corruption.
Specifically, in 1951, he
41
accepted a bribe in return for dissolving the government. In addition,
the king’s name was mentioned in investigations pertaining to the
illegal procurement of weapons for the Egyptian army during the 1948
42
war with Israel.
The state of the economy and the monarchy’s
43
corrupt misuses of power led to the revolution of July 23, 1952, also
known as the Free Officers’ Revolution, and the eventual abolishment
44
Although the Free Officers’
of the constitutional monarchy.
The Fight for Democracy in Egypt’s Liberation Square, CHI. COUNCIL
1 (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Events/FY%2011%2
0Events/02_February_11/EgyptBackgroundPaper110207.pdf; see
generally KATHRIN NINA WIEDL, THE ROLE OF THE COPTS IN THE
NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN EGYPT UNTIL THE 1919 REVOLUTION (2007).
36
‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 8; Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 2.
37
OSMAN, supra note 34, at 25; Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 2.
38
OSMAN, supra note 34, at 37.
39
Id. at 37, 55; BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 54.
40
See OSMAN, supra note 34, at 38; see also BRADLEY, supra note 28,
at 31.
41
OSMAN, supra note 34, at 38.
42
Id.
43
Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 2.
44
National Integrity System Study Egypt 2009 (“NIS Study Egypt”),
TRANSPARENCY INT’L 18 (2009),
http://archive.transparency.org/publications/publications/nis_egypt_200
9.
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Revolution was a military coup d’état, it was strongly embraced and
45
reinforced by the people.
Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser was among the
46
officers of the revolution. In the span of a few years, Nasser was able
to sideline Egypt’s first president, Major General Mohammad Naguib,
dissolve all political parties except for the Arab Socialist Union
47
Party, and create a new constitutional order defined by a powerful
48
presidency. As a result, there were few checks on Nasser’s political
49
power.
Presidential power was already significant before the 1958
enactment of the Emergency Law, which gave the president the power
50
to circumscribe non-governmental political activity. The Emergency
Law would remain in effect for all but eighteen months between 1967
51
and 2012.
With executive power unrestrained and political activity
greatly restricted, conventional corruption began to fester under Nasser
as administrators and bureaucrats abused their power to prey on
52
citizens and siphon off resources from the state.
Anwar Sadat ascended to the presidency after Nasser’s death
53
Sadat immediately backed a new constitution—the 1971
in 1970.
Constitution—in what he promoted as an effort to restore greater

‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 8; but see BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 27
(describing the Free Officers as “hijack[ing] the popular unrest to seize
power”).
46
BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 12.
47
Id. at 14; NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 19.
48
SELMA BOTMAN, EGYPT FROM INDEPENDENCE TO REVOLUTION,
1919-1952 30-40 (1991); OSMAN, supra note 34, at 45.
49
TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 59-60 (2007).
50
Lisa Reynolds Wolfe, Cold War Legacy: Egypt’s Emergency Law
162 of 1958 (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.coldwarstudies.com/2011/02/01/cold-war-legacy-egyptsemergency-law-162-of-1958/.
51
Sarah El Deeb, Egypt Emergency Law Lapses, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 31, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/31/egyptemergency-law-lapse_n_1559110.html.
52
See MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 82-83.
53
OSMAN, supra note 34, at 117.
45
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54

democracy to Egypt. Sadat also dismantled the Arab Socialist Union
Party and allowed previously banned political parties to re-enter
55
political life. The new parties, however, entered political life under a
tightly controlled process that was dominated by the executive
56
branch. In the later years of Sadat’s presidency, despite the fact that
57
Egyptian law prohibited acts of bribery and the like, there was a
58
glaring increase in conventional corruption.
Notably, vote rigging
59
flourished and referenda typically resulted in 99% “yes” votes.
During this time, Egypt also experienced an emergence of parasitic
60
links between sections of the public sector and private industry.
After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Hosni Mubarak rose to
61
the presidency, and the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was
62
the only party represented in presidential elections until 2005, began
63
its dominance of the political realm. Conventional corruption soared
James Feuille, Reforming Egypt’s Constitution: Hope for Egyptian
Democracy?, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 237, 241-42 (2011).
55
NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 19-20.
56
Sahar F. Aziz, Revolution Without Reform? A Critique of Egypt’s
Election Laws, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 40 (2013); MOUSTAFA,
supra note 49, at 90 (“But Sadat’s shift to a multiparty system was
never intended to be a complete and comprehensive democratic
transition. Rather, it was to be a tightly controlled process of political
liberalization that would give the appearance of free party competition
with few concrete concessions from the regime.”).
57
See, e.g., Egypt, Law No. 62 of 1975 (Illegal Profit-Making) AlJarida Al-Rasmiyya [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE], July 7, 1975; NIS Study
Egypt, supra note 44, at 146 (“The Penal Code criminalises both active
and passive bribery, as well as using public resources for private
gain.”).
58
See OSMAN, supra note 34, at 123.
59
Feuille, supra note 54, at 242; MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 70.
60
OSMAN, supra note 34, at 123; BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 45.
61
Feuille, supra note 54, at 243.
62
NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 20.
63
‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 13; Inside Story: How Did Egypt Become So
Corrupt?, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 7, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/02/201128111
236245847.html; Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, Political Finance Systems
in Egypt, Regulation and Disclosure: The Way Out (Nov. 2008), at 3,
54
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64

to extraordinary levels during Mubarak’s reign.
Over this time,
Transparency International reported a marked increase in the wasting of
65
In
public resources, as well as embezzlement, bribery, and forgery.
addition, the parasitic links between the public and private sectors that
66
emerged under Sadat only intensified under Mubarak. A small group
of businessmen with close ties to the president’s son, Gamal Mubarak,
gained enormous influence over the economy and began running it
67
pursuant to their personal interests. Although these businessmen may
have obtained their influence through technically legal means, their
interests lied in maintaining a status quo that was defined by
68
conventional corruption.
One very problematic aspect of the increase in conventional
corruption was the executive’s willingness and ability to steal
69
elections.
As just one example, during the 1995 elections, electoral
70
irregularities were widespread.
The Independent Commission for
Election Review reported that police stood by while representatives of
opposition candidates were expelled or turned away from polling
stations, ballot boxes arrived stuffed with voting papers, and polling
71
stations were ransacked by paid thugs.
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Money%20and%20Poli
tics/Research%20and%20Publications/Reports%20and%20Papers/Engl
ish/PoliticalFinanceSystems_in_Egypt.pdf (“The [NDP] is built and
based on the legacy of the ASU [Arab Socialist Union] including most
of its old guard.”).
64
See ‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 8; Bassiouni, supra note 35.
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NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 23-31.
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BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 46.
67
ALAA AL ASWANY, ON THE STATE OF EGYPT, WHAT MADE THE
REVOLUTION INEVITABLE vii (2011); see OSMAN, supra note 34, at
218-19.
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Democratization in Egypt in a Globalizing World, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL.
LEGAL STUDIES 313, 320 (2013).
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Feuille, supra note 54, at 243; Ahmed Eldakak, Approaching Rule of
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Where We Should Be, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 261, 278-79
(2012); BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 35.
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Charles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression in Mubarak’s
Egypt, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75, 83 (2000).
71
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Under Mubarak, many facets of society openly and
72
comprehensively discussed conventional corruption.
The general
public was fully aware of the costs of conventional corruption for the
country’s political stability and the threat it posed to economic and
73
social development.
Despite such awareness, conventional
corruption represented the ruling social law and a behavior that
74
governed various aspects of Egyptian life.

IV.

THE ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT: A FIGHT AGAINST
CONVENTIONAL CORRUPTION

In an extraordinary set of events, popular protests in Tahrir
75
Square (together with workers’ strikes on factory floors) provided the
76
tipping point for a revolution.
The date for initial protests, January
See NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 24; see also MENA-OECD
Business Climate Investment Strategy, Phase 1 Policy Assessment,
Egypt, Anti-Corruption, 13 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/psd/46341460.pdf (“Corruption allegations
are frequent in the media and people often speak of the practice as
affecting all parts of society.”).
73
See ‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 9.
74
See id.; see also BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 164 (“[C]orruption is a
disease that has long spread to all of Egypt’s organs. There is literally
no end to it; it reaches precisely from the officer who takes five pounds
to overlook a speeding offense all the way to the top.”).
75
Ian Hartshorn, Labor Unions Under Attack in Morsi’s Egypt,
MUFTAH (Nov. 30, 2012), http://muftah.org/labor-unions-under-attackin-morsis-egypt/ (“While western media focused its attention on the
Tweeting and Facebooking [of] upper middle class youth in Tahrir
Square, much of the 2011 revolution took place in the fields and factory
floors among Egypt’s working poor. The Land Center for Human
Rights, a leading human rights NGO focused on workers and farmers,
described the general strike of Egypt’s industrial and port workers on
February 9, 2011, combined with the farmers’ protests, as a ‘knockout
punch’ to the Mubarak regime.”).
76
Using the term “revolution” to describe the events of January 25,
2011 is arguably only aspirational at this point in time. See John
Liolos, Note, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and
Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. IN’TL &
COMP. L. R. 219, 229-32 (2013) (comparing a “revolution” to a “coup
d’état”).
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25, 2011, was deliberately chosen to coincide with Egypt’s National
77
Police Day —a day that once commemorated Egyptian freedom, but
evolved to represent the deterioration of Egypt’s corrupt police
78
Conventional corruption played a significant role in
forces.
motivating the January 25th revolution as well as other revolutions in
79
the Middle East throughout Arab Spring. During the revolution, the
popular chant outside of the NDP’s headquarters in el-Minya, 245
kilometers south of Cairo, was “[c]orruption caused this country’s
80
destruction!”
Egypt’s popular uprisings focused on the removal of the
81
corrupt Mubarak regime.
Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and a well-known opposition
leader in Egypt, expressly called for a military coup on his Twitter
82
page. Meanwhile, Mubarak called on the military to intervene on his
Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup D’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J.
291, 342 (2012).
78
Ahmed Zaki Osman, Egypt’s Police: From Liberators to Oppressors,
EGYPT INDEP. (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypts-police-liberatorsoppressors; Egypt’s Police Widely Despised, Viewed as ‘Corrupt and
Abusive’, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/03/egypt-policecorrupt_n_818088.html.
79
Anne Applebaum, Why the Anti-Corruption Movement is the New
Human Rights Movement, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2012/12/an
ti_corruption_movement_protests_riots_and_marches_across_the_glob
e_are.html; RUTHERFORD, supra note 34, at xxxiv (“The scope of this
corruption and inequality became one of the triggers of the January 25
uprising.”); Aziz, supra note 56, at 3 (“Egyptians sought to upend an
entrenched system of cronyism, nepotism, and pervasive corruption
that squandered the future of an entire generation.”).
80
Mona El-Ghobashy, The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution, in THE
JOURNEY TO TAHRIR, REVOLUTION, PROTEST, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
EGYPT 21, 36 (Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012).
81
‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 13-15; Ursula Lindsey, Revolution and
Counterrevolution in the Egyptian Media, in THE JOURNEY TO TAHRIR,
REVOLUTION, PROTEST, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EGYPT 53, 53-54
(Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012).
82
Varol, supra note 77, at 302, 343.
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83

behalf.
Instead, on February 11, 2011, in what has been termed a
84
“democratic coup d’etat,”
the military issued a communiqué
declaring that it was intervening to protect the country and “to sponsor
85
the legitimate demands of the people.” Hours after the release of the
communiqué, Mubarak’s Vice President, Omar Suleiman, announced
that Mubarak had resigned his post and the Supreme Council of the
86
Armed Forces (SCAF) had assumed power.
Mubarak was later convicted for complicity in the killing of
87
protestors during the uprising and was sentenced to life in prison.
The conviction, however, has since been rejected and Mubarak will
now face a retrial which could result in a different penalty or even
88
acquittal. Mubarak and his sons, Gamal and Alaa, will also be tried
on corruption charges for allegedly redirecting presidential palace
89
renovation funds to be used on their own private residences.
Many
members of Mubarak’s regime have been sentenced to several years in

Id. at 343.
Id. at 345.
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Id. at 344.
86
Id. For further discussion of the January 25th revolution, see JEREMY
M. SHARP, CONG. RES. SERV., EGYPT: THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/157112.pdf.
87
Jamie Davis, Mubarak Sentenced to Life in Prison, JURIST (June 2,
2012), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/06/ex-egypt-presidentmubarak-sentenced-to-life-in-prison.php.
88
David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Court Rejects Verdict Against
Mubarak, N.Y. TIMES, at A.1 (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/world/middleeast/egyptian-courtgrants-hosni-mubarak-a-new-trial.html?_r=0; Associated Press, As
Turmoil Persists, Mubarak Returns to Courtroom in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/as-turmoilpersists-mubarak-returns-to-courtroom-in-egypt.html.
89
El-Sayed Gamal El-Din, Egypt’s Toppled Mubarak and Sons to Face
Corruption Trial in August, AHRAM ONLINE (July 17, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/76720/Business/Econo
my/Egypts-toppled-Mubarak-and-sons-to-face-corruption.aspx.
83
84

41

Journal of International Law

prison on charges of corruption, embezzlement of public funds, unjust
90
enrichment, and peddling in influence.
Egypt’s transition to democracy took a big step forward when
elections for the People’s Assembly, the lower house of parliament,
began in November 2011 and continued in staggered rounds until
91
January 2012.
Nearly all political parties, except for Mubarak’s
NDP, which was dissolved by Egypt’s High Administrative Court for
monopolizing and manipulating elections, were allowed to freely
establish themselves and participate in the post-revolution
92
parliamentary elections.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and
Justice Party emerged as the clear victor of the elections, obtaining
93
47% of the seats in the People’s Assembly.
Although the Supreme
Constitutional Court dissolved the People’s Assembly only a few
months later because election officials had impermissibly allowed
94
political parties to compete for seats designated for independents, the
elections were widely viewed as free and fair by independent
95
monitoring organizations.
Hillary Stemple, Egypt Court Sentences Former Mubarak Associates
on Corruption Charges, JURIST (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/09/egypt-court-sentences-formermubarak-associates-on-corruption-charges.php.
91
Varol, supra note 77, at 350.
92
Id. at 305.
93
Id. at 352; Max Fisher, Egypt’s Constitutional Crisis, Explained as a
Simple Timeline, WASH POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/06/egy
pts-constitutional-crisis-explained-as-a-simple-timeline/ (last updated
Dec. 6, 2012).
94
Haider Hamoudi, Democracy and the Supreme Constitutional Court
of Egypt, JURIST (June 28, 2012),
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/06/haider-hamoudi-scc-parliament.php;
David D. Kirkpatrick, Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Egypt’s
Parliament, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-politicalshowdown-in-egypt-as-court-invalidatesparliament.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Aziz, supra note 56, at 39-40.
95
See, e.g., The Carter Center, Final Report of the Carter Center
Mission to Witness the 2011-2012 Parliamentary Elections in Egypt, 2,
64, (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/el
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Before the People’s Assembly was dissolved, however, it
appointed 100 representatives to the Constituent Assembly to draft the
96
post-revolution constitution.
Like the People’s Assembly, the
97
Constituent Assembly was dominated by Islamists.
Soon thereafter,
in June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood continued its domination of
electoral politics when, following an electoral run-off, Mohamed Morsi
98
was declared Egypt’s first democratically elected president.
Morsi strongly asserted that he would curtail corruption in
Egypt, and although little progress was made in the first few months of
99
his presidency, polls showed that the majority of the Egyptian public
100
had confidence in the national government.
However, serious
problems began to emerge for Morsi when he shifted his focus toward
ensuring an abbreviated process for drafting a new constitution. On
November 22, 2012, in the midst of speculation as to whether the
Constituent Assembly would be disbanded by the Supreme
Constitutional Court, Morsi issued a declaration stating that the
Constituent Assembly would not be subject to judicial oversight and
ection_reports/egypt-2011-2012-final-rpt.pdf; Varol, supra note 77, at
350.
96
Fisher, supra note 93.
97
Id.; see also Jill I. Goldenziel, Veiled Political Questions: Islamic
Dress, Constitutionalism, and the Ascendance of the Courts, 61 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 14 (2013) (stating that the “Islamist” label has generally
been applied broadly to any group that fuses Islam and politics,
whether supportive of constitutional democracy or violent extremism).
98
Celebration in Egypt as Morsi Declared Winner, AL JAZEERA (June
24, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201262412445190
400.html.
99
Sahar Aziz & Derek Clinger, Egypt’s Corruption Woes, GLOBAL
PUB. SQUARE BLOGS (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/02/08/egypts-corruptionwoes/; Erik Kirschbaum, Egypt Slips in Corruption Index Despite Arab
Spring, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/05/us-corruption-transparencyegypt-idUSBRE8B406Q20121205.
100
Mohamed Younis, Egyptians’ Views of Government Crashed Before
Overthrow, GALLUP (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163796/egyptian-views-governmentcrashed-overthrow.aspx.
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that he would have the “power to take all necessary measures and
101
procedures” against any potential threat to the revolution.
Shortly
thereafter, the Constituent Assembly approved the draft of the new
102
which was put to a two-round referendum vote on
constitution,
December 15th and 22nd of 2012 and approved by 63.8% of voters,
103
amidst very low turnout.
The 2012 Constitution increased
separation of powers and restraints on the executive, but was criticized
heavily for its lack of human rights protections and its deference to
104
Islam in state affairs.
Egyptians’ early support of Morsi and the national
government began to steadily decline in the wake of Morsi’s November
105
declaration.
Frequent power cuts, gas shortages, and security
106
breaches added to the decline in Morsi’s popularity.
In June 2013,
Morsi blamed the country’s problems on Mubarak-era corruption that
107
was, in his words, “greater than we had imagined.”
This excuse,
however, did not appease the Egyptian people. On June 30, 2013,
David D. Kirkpatrick & Mayy El Sheikh, Citing Deadlock, Egypt’s
Leader Seizes New Power and Plans Mubarak Retrial, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/world/middleeast/egyptspresident-morsi-gives-himself-new-powers.html?_r=0.
102
David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution
Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/panel-draftingegypts-constitution-prepares-quick-vote.html?_r=0.
103
Egypt Approves Disputed Draft Constitution, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 25,
2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/201212251825337
958.html.
104
Mirette F. Mabrouk, The View From a Distance: Egypt’s
Contentious New Constitution, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE 5-6 (Jan. 31,
2013),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/1/31%
20egypt%20mabrouk/0131_Egypt_Mabrouk.pdf.
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Morsi Tells Al-Ahram, AHRAM ONLINE (June 7, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/73389/Egypt/Politics/Mubarakera-corruption-greater-than-we-imagined,-Eg.aspx.
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millions of Egyptians began to demonstrate in Tahrir Square and
108
elsewhere, calling for Morsi to step down.
On July 1, 2013, Egypt’s
military gave Morsi forty-eight hours to resolve the government’s
109
Finally,
disputes with the demonstrators or face a military solution.
on July 3, 2013, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi led the military in
removing Morsi from power, suspending the 2012 Constitution, and
installing Adly Monsour, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
110
The military’s actions,
Constitutional Court, as acting president.
111
although highly controversial, were celebrated by many Egyptians.
The military, along with Morsi’s political opposition,
subsequently appointed ten legal experts to a committee tasked with
making recommendations to a larger fifty-member committee for
112
amending the 2012 Constitution.
In August 2013, the committee of

David D. Kirkpatrick, Kareem Fahim & Ben Hubbard, By the
Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pag
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/egyptprotests.html?pagewanted=all.
110
David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi is Taken
into Military Custody, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pag
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111
Sarah Lynch, Egyptians Celebrate in the Streets, but Instability
Remains, USA TODAY (July 3, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/03/egypt-morsideposed-military/2488057/. For an interesting discussion of how anticorruption efforts in countries with politically active militaries can lead
to “good governance” coups that do not, in fact, lead to restored
democracies, see Nick Robinson & Nawreen Sattar, When Corruption
is an Emergency: “Good Governance” Coups and Bangladesh, 35
FORDHAM. INT’L L. J. 737 (2012).
112
Osman El Sharnoubi, 80 Constitutional Articles Revised:
Amendments Committee, AHRAM ONLINE (July 31, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/77890/Egypt/Politics-/constitutional-articles-revised-Amendments-commit.aspx; Mokhtar
Awad, Egypt’s New Road Map, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
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ten proposed a draft that was generally viewed as an edit to the 2012
113
Constitution.
Aside from its proposed creation of a unicameral
legislature, the draft largely retains the same separation of powers
114
The most significant changes
between the branches of government.
115
pertain to the reduced role of Islam in state affairs.

V.

COMBATING CONVENTIONAL CORRUPTION IN
POST-REVOLUTION EGYPT

In seeking solutions for conventional corruption, it is common
for politicians and the general public to push for moral reform above all
else. However, appealing for moral reform in isolation from political
and administrative reform prevents a clear understanding of the
situation and distracts from the real causes of conventional
116
corruption.
Furthermore, even certain kinds of political and
INTERNATIONAL PEACE (July 12, 2013),
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/.
113
Sarah El Masry, Constitutional Amendments: Repeating Past
Mistakes?, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/04/constitutionalamendments-repeating-past-mistakes/.
114
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 20 Aug. 2013,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2013.08.20__proposed_changes_to_2012_constitution_expert_committee_idea_eng
lish.pdf; El Masry, supra note 113.
115
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 20 Aug. 2013,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2013.08.20__proposed_changes_to_2012_constitution_expert_committee_idea_eng
lish.pdf; El Masry, supra note 113.
116
See ASWANY, supra note 67, at 184; see also ROBERT KLITGAARD,
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION xii (1988) (“Too often it is assumed that
organizations or entire governments are corrupt simply because people
are immoral; and, it is concluded, nothing can be done to curb
corruption short of generations of moral education. But let us avoid the
fallacy of composition. Let us ask instead how organizations and
countries might change their ‘systems of information, rules for
decisions, and incentives’ in order to reduce corruption.”) (citing
Thomas C. Schelling, Command and Control, in SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT (James W. McKie
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administrative reform can be unhelpful if the foundations for reducing
conventional corruption are not in place. In this regard, even the best
anti-corruption legislation will fail if implemented in a political
117
environment that is not conducive to real scrutiny.
In order to curb conventional corruption, the people must, at a
minimum, impose upon their government a separation of powers,
118
complete with a system of checks and balances.
As was stated by
Charles de Montesquieu, whose bedrock ideas have been implemented
throughout the world, “[s]o that one cannot abuse power, power must
119
check power by the arrangement of things.”
When powers are
separated and limited, the government can effectively enact laws
prohibiting government officials from abusing their office, enforce such
120
laws, and impartially determine when the laws have been violated.
Friction in the form of checks must exist between the branches of
government in order for the political environment to be open to real
scrutiny. This is especially true with regard to restraints on the
121
executive.
ed., Washington: The Brookings Institution) (1974)); THEOBALD, supra
note 15, at 152.
117
CHATHAM HOUSE, DEFINING AND TACKLING CORRUPTION 8 (Feb.
2012),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middl
e%20East/0212egyptsummary_corruption.pdf; FREEDOM HOUSE,
COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2012: EGYPT,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Egypt%20%20FINAL.pdf (noting that the Egyptian government of Prime
Minister Ahmed Nazif, in power from 2004 until January 2011,
initiated numerous laws to limit money laundering, improve auditing
standards, and regulate banking transactions, yet Transparency
International still ranked Egypt 98 out of 178 countries in 2010).
118
Yingling, supra note 2, at 271.
119
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 155 (Anne M. Cohler,
Basia C. Miller & Harold S. Stone eds. and trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1989) (1748); THEOBALD, supra note 15, at 152.
120
Yingling, supra note 2, at 271; CHATHAM HOUSE, supra note 117, at
8.
121
Yingling, supra note 2, at 272; FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 117
(“As with other aspects of democratic governance, meaningful
improvements on corruption and transparency will require a decisive
break from the model of an all-powerful, unaccountable executive.”).
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Real checks and balances were not totally absent from
Mubarak’s Egypt. For example, the 1971 Constitution gave the
Supreme Constitutional Court the exclusive authority to determine the
122
constitutionality of laws enacted by the other two branches.
The
123
1971 Constitution also guaranteed the independence of the judiciary,
124
along with tenure of office,
so that judges would be protected from
the whims of the executive. And even though the 1971 Constitution
allowed the president to appoint judges without the final consent of the
125
legislature,
the judiciary was perceived as one of the least corrupt
126
In practice, the heads of the Court of
public authorities in Egypt.
Cassation, the High Administrative Court, and the Supreme
Constitutional Court often declared electoral laws and other legislative
procedures unconstitutional, thus indicating that the judiciary enjoyed a
127
significant degree of independence.
ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007,
art. 175; see also MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 74-77 (explaining that
although the 1971 Constitution confirmed the establishment of a
Supreme Constitutional Court, the Court was not actually established
until 1979).
123
ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007,
arts. 65, 165, 166, & 174.
124
Id. at arts. 168, 177.
125
See NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 81; Aziz, supra note 56, at
71 (“The most powerful tool over the judiciary in the president’s
arsenal is the authority to appoint senior judges to the highest courts.
Unchecked political appointment of senior judges who in turn appoint
their deputies in a hierarchical judicial system compromises judicial
independence.”).
126
BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 21 (“[T]he judiciary has often proved to
be a thorn in the regime’s side.”); NIS Study Egypt, supra note 45, at
11.
127
NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 81-82; but see Lama Abu Odeh,
Of Law and the Revolution, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 341, 348 (2013)
(writing that even though Egypt’s judiciary occasionally overturned
repressive or unfair laws, “such acts of defiance, against a background
of dictatorial rule interspersed with contrary acts of compliance by the
same judiciary, signal less a thick judicial sphere acting legally than a
political sphere in which the judiciary carefully calculates its
122
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The 1971 Constitution also contained several mechanisms that
sought to hold the executive accountable to the legislature. For
example, the former lower house of parliament, the People’s Assembly,
could withdraw its confidence from any of the ministers or prime
minister’s deputies through a motion by one-tenth of its members,
128
followed by a majority vote of the entire assembly.
The People’s
Assembly was also entitled to form committees for the purpose of factfinding and conducting investigations into the activities of
129
administrative bodies.
Unfortunately, unlike the judiciary’s mechanisms, the
130
legislature’s mechanisms were rarely exercised in full.
There was a
131
wide gap between de jure and de facto accountability in Egypt,
especially with regard to the legislature’s checks on the executive.
Opposition parties in the People’s Assembly struggled to play an
132
effective role in combating conventional corruption.
This was
primarily due to the restrictions on their activities imposed by the
133
Emergency Law,
which permitted, among other things, arbitrary
arrests and searches, indefinite detention without trial, heightened
censorship, and restraints on the gathering of more than five people at
134
any one time,
thus giving Egyptian authorities and the NDP the
position”); Aziz, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that, unfortunately, “the
executive branch sought to use the judiciary’s reputation and prestige to
validate sham elections”).
128
ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26,
2007, art. 126.
129
Id. at art. 131.
130
NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 11.
131
Id. at 13.
132
Id. at 27. For further details on the struggles of opposition parties to
combat corruption in Egypt, see MOHAMED A. ‘ARAFA, TOWARDS A
NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW IN EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, EGYPTIAN ANTI-BRIBERY LAW, AND
ISLAMIC LAW (2013).
133
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134
Varol, supra note 77, at 341-42; Mona El-Ghobashy, Unsettling the
Authorities: Constitutional Reform in Egypt, in THE JOURNEY TO
TAHRIR, REVOLUTION, PROTEST, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EGYPT 122,
127 (Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012).
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ability to circumvent many legal and political checks on executive
135
power.
The regime made full use of its Emergency Law privileges,
136
particularly during election season.
As a result, the NDP constituted
an overwhelming majority in parliament, which allowed the party to
137
continually drown out opposition voices.
With the January 25th revolution, Egypt gained a rare
opportunity to repair the fundamentals of its governance system and
combat conventional corruption. Many Egyptians had high hopes for a
new constitution. For some, these high hopes turned to disappointment
when the Constituent Assembly released the final draft of the 2012
138
Constitution.
However, even though the 2012 Constitution includes
139
a questionable deference to religion in state affairs
and less reform
on individual rights than many had hoped for, the reality is that, when
measured against the Egyptian constitutional tradition, the new text
brings forth a number of improvements to the governance system and is
140
not the catastrophe that many have identified.
First, the 2012 Constitution includes many of the positive
aspects of the 1971 Constitution. Judicial independence and security of
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137
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139
See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Dec. 26,
2012, arts. 2, 4, & 219; Marc Lynch, The Battle for Egypt’s
Constitution, PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL SCIENCE 4 (Jan. 11,
2013), http://pomeps.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/POMEPS_BriefBooklet17_Egypt_web.pdf.
140
Zaid Al-Ali, The New Egyptian Constitution: An Initial Assessment
of its Merits and Flaws, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 26, 2012),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/zaid-al-ali/new-egyptian-constitutioninitial-assessment-of-its-merits-and-flaws; Shadi Hamid, Is There an
Egyptian Nation?, in THE BATTLE FOR EGYPT’S CONSTITUTION,
PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL SCIENCE 25 (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://pomeps.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/POMEPS_BriefBooklet17_Egypt_web.pdf.
135
136

50

Journal of International Law

141

tenure for judges is protected.
Also, the Supreme Constitutional
Court is still exclusively competent to review the constitutionality of
142
And, with
laws, giving it the ability to check the other branches.
respect to the legislature, individual legislators have the right to request
information, demand a statement from the government, or even
interrogate the prime minister in relation to urgent matters of public
143
importance.
The 2012 Constitution also imposes new limits on the
executive. For example, while the president previously served a six144
year term without term limits,
the president shall now be elected
145
every four years and may only be re-elected once.
Also, the
constitution provides stronger restrictions on the president’s power to
call a state of emergency and on the president’s powers during that
146
period.
In addition, whereas the president previously faced few
147
obstacles in dissolving the parliament,
he may now only do so
148
pursuant to a public referendum.
The current version of the
constitution even stipulates that if the referendum fails, then the
149
president must resign;
however, proposed amendments contemplate
150
the removal of this stipulation.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Dec. 26, 2012,
arts. 168, 170.
142
Id. at art. 175.
143
Id. at arts. 123-25.
144
ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26,
2007, art. 77.
145
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 133.
146
Id. at art. 148; see also Mabrouk, supra note 104, at 5 (“[T]he
president’s authority to declare a state of emergency has been hobbled;
it has to be approved by a majority of both houses.”).
147
El-Ghobashy, supra note 134, at 143.
148
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art.
127.
149
Id.; see also Holger Albrecht, Unbalancing Power in Egypt’s
Constitution, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/31/unbalancing_power
_in_egypt_s_constitution (“Article 127 is an interesting attempt to
balance power relations between the president and parliament. It
allows the president to move to dissolve parliament through a popular
141
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The 2012 Constitution also imposes new legislative checks on
the executive branch. Parliament is now empowered to dismiss the
government, the prime minister, or any individual minister by a simple
151
majority of its members.
In contrast, under the 1971 Constitution,
the parliament could only dismiss the government after obtaining the
152
president’s approval or a two-thirds majority vote.
In addition, the
2012 Constitution puts forth a method for the House of
Representatives, the new lower house of parliament, to impeach the
president by a two-thirds majority, after which the president shall be
153
tried before a special court composed of heads of the judiciary.
Although the 2012 Constitution embodies an improvement
with respect to the division of power in Egypt, it is by no means
perfect. To note just a couple of deficiencies, the constitution provides
no legislative check on the president’s power to appoint judges at the
highest levels and also fails to set forth any procedures for determining
154
judicial salaries.
Another caveat is the Egyptian military, which in
its efforts to maintain order until a new government is elected has
shown a willingness to disregard power structures and the rights of

vote, a provision that might come as a necessary step to solve a
deadlock between the two institutions. Yet, an important clause has
been introduced in order to impede the article’s abuse: losing the
popular referendum triggers the automatic resignation of the
president.”).
150
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 20 Aug. 2013, art. 112,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2013.08.20__proposed_changes_to_2012_constitution_expert_committee_idea_eng
lish.pdf; Bassem Sabry, 22 Key Points in Egypt’s New Draft
Constitution, Al-Monitor (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/egypt-draft-constitutionguide.html.
151
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art.
126.
152
ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26,
2007, art. 127.
153
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art.
152.
154
Al-Ali, supra note 140.
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those who oppose its actions.
However, even though the
constitution is imperfect, and the transition has been chaotic, there is
hope for a future Egypt with less conventional corruption. If Egypt is
able to hold free and fair elections in 2014 and emerge with a party in
power facing unprecedented scrutiny due to a newly relevant political
opposition and a constitution that limits the powers of the
156
presidency,
then Egypt will at least have a chance of succeeding in
its fight against conventional corruption.

VI.

THE LIKELY RISE OF UNCONVENTIONAL
CORRUPTION IN EGYPT

Unfortunately, measures aimed at combating conventional
157
corruption do not also solve problems of unconventional corruption.
In fact, when conventional corruption declines, a rise in unconventional
158
corruption is usually on the horizon.
Unconventional corruption, in
this regard, is an unfortunate side effect of necessary reforms to combat
conventional corruption. Although the occurrence of unconventional
corruption can thus be an indicator of progress, unconventional
corruption is not a necessary evil for a democracy that has recently
implemented measures to combat conventional corruption.
As
described below, there are solutions that can and should be
implemented to combat unconventional corruption.
There are two specific reasons why Egypt could be susceptible
to a rise in unconventional corruption in the coming years. The first is
a likely increase in the supply of campaign contributions and
expenditures. If reforms focused on reducing conventional corruption
are successful, private parties who are accustomed to getting their way
through acts of bribery and the like will be forced to seek alternative
means of achieving their objectives, and these alternative means are

See Mayy El Sheikh and Kareem Fahim, Dozens Are Killed in Street
Violence Across Egypt, N.Y Times (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/middleeast/clashes-inegypt-leave-at-least-15-dead.html?_r=0.
156
Lynch, supra note 139, at 45.
157
Yingling, supra note 2, at 275.
158
Id. at 270-71.
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likely to include campaign contributions and expenditures.
In
addition, many individuals who once flaunted near complete control of
the economy may find it necessary to utilize campaign contributions
and expenditures in order to wield the kind of influence that they
160
brandished under Mubarak.
The second reason why Egypt is susceptible to an increase in
unconventional corruption is a likely increase in the demand for
campaign contributions and expenditures. While a ruling party
incumbent of the past may have been able to rely on the ultimate act of
conventional corruption—stealing an election—to stay in power,
incumbents will now be required to communicate with their
161
constituencies to keep their support, and this requires financing.
Furthermore, due to the events of the last few years, ruling party
incumbents can no longer safely forgo actual campaigns with the
expectation that the state-run media will dominate the landscape and
communicate the incumbent’s re-election message to the public.
To elaborate on this last point, the Mubarak regime was able
to use the state-run media in a way that made it unnecessary for NDP
incumbents to seek contributions and expenditures from outside parties
162
in order to run comprehensive campaigns.
The NDP mobilized the
See Campos & Giovannoni, supra note 30, at 2 (concluding that
lobbying activities are an important alternative tool of influence when
bribe offering becomes less effective).
160
See ASWANY, supra note 67, at vii.
161
See Ahmed Feteha, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy: Funding
Egypt’s Presidential Campaigns, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2012),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/38063/Business/Econo
my/The-best-democracy-money-can-buy-Funding-Egypts-pr.aspx
(“According to [Professor] Abdel Aziz, campaign activities fall into
two categories: promotion in the mass media, and round-level activities
including popular conferences and drives to provinces. Though the
latter is relatively inexpensive, both require large amounts of
funding.”).
162
Sharif Abdel Kouddous, After Mubarak: Fighting For Press
Freedom in Egypt, THE NATION (June 20, 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/161555/after-mubarak-fighting-pressfreedom-egypt (“Under Mubarak, state-owned media was a propaganda
arm of the government, parroting party dogma while dismissing public
criticism and political opposition.”); Al-Mashat, supra note 63, at 11
159
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state-run media to serve its own interests by promoting party policies
and exaggerating achievements, all while excluding coverage of other
163
parties.
As recently as the 2010 parliamentary elections, the staterun media showed a marked interest in giving positive coverage to state
164
figures.
The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies found that,
without exception, all of the state-owned newspapers exhibited a clear
165
pro-NDP bias in their election coverage.
The state television
channels were also biased. For example, on Channel 2, in the lead up
to the election, the NDP received 56.6% of the coverage (71% positive
and 1% negative). In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood received only
166
10% of the coverage (2% positive and 92% negative).
However, this situation has changed, and will continue to
change, because contemporary digital technology has destroyed much
of the government’s capacity to monopolize the means of broadcast
167
communication.
Technology, besides facilitating the rise of webbased blogs and social media, has been an impetus for private and
168
independent news journalism.
Even under Mubarak and the NDP,
state media organs were already losing ground to private upstarts such
169
The private media gained a
as Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk.
firm foothold on the Egyptian media landscape, and although it has not
been completely immune from government influence or eliminated the
(“The Egyptian government, which inherited a vast state apparatus, has
been in total control of state resources, mass media outlets and legal
channels for political participation. This diminishes any possibility for
real and substantial competition.”).
163
CAIRO INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES (“CIHRS”), Media
and Parliamentary Elections in Egypt: Evaluation of Media
Performance in Parliamentary Elections (Oct. 28/Dec. 15, 2010), at 76;
Eldakak, supra note 69, at 289-92; MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 96.
164
CIHRS, supra note 163, at 9.
165
Id. at 39.
166
Id. at 70.
167
See generally KAYLAN GEIGER & FRAUS MASRI, THE RED LINE:
PRESS FREEDOM IN POST-MUBARAK EGYPT (2012).
168
JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, PERFORMATIVE REVOLUTION IN EGYPT: AN
ESSAY IN CULTURAL POWER 69 (2011); see also Eldakak, supra note
69, at 289 (explaining that the rise of privately owned independent
media was also caused by the state-run media’s lack of credibility).
169
ASHRAF KHALIL, LIBERATION SQUARE: INSIDE THE EGYPTIAN
REVOLUTION AND THE REBIRTH OF A NATION 290 (2012).
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state-run media’s bias, partiality, and prejudice,
it has reduced it in
171
significant ways.
With the growth of private media, including wellknown satellite channels, elected ruling-party officials can no longer
rely on the dominance and bias of the state-run media to communicate
their messages in lieu of conducting actual campaigns that require vast
sums of money.
Even if the government attempts to censor private media, as
172
the military-controlled post-Morsi government has done,
such
efforts are unlikely to return the state-run media to the position of
influence that it once held. Cracks are emerging in the once rigid walls
of the state-run media not only because of private media, but also
173
because of pure economic inertia.
The state media machine, like
most public sector enterprises in Egypt, is significantly overstaffed with
thousands of phantom employees who draw a paycheck for barely
174
working.
The combination of declining readership and viewers,
along with the immense economic drain associated with supporting the
propaganda machine, will eventually cause the state-run media to
175
change its ways.
Thus, ruling-party incumbents will not be able to
safely forgo actual campaigns with the expectation that the state-run
media will dominate the political landscape in a biased manner and
communicate the incumbent’s re-election message to the public.
One factor that could potentially mitigate an increase in
demand for campaign financing is Egypt’s new electoral system. Prior
to the January 25th revolution, members of parliament were elected
under a plurality (winner-take-all) system, in which Egyptians voted for
176
individual candidates.
In contrast, Egypt has recently experimented
with electing legislators under a “mixed system,” in which only onethird of the parliament is elected on a plurality basis, while the other
Eldakak, supra note 69, at 289-90.
KHALIL, supra note 169, at 290; CIHRS, supra note 163, at 9; NIS
Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 21-22.
172
Kevin Liffey, Egypt Expels Al Jazeera Journalists in Crackdown on
Qatari Channel, Reuters (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/01/us-egypt-protests-jazeeraidUSBRE97S0ZL20130901.
173
KHALIL, supra note 169, at 295.
174
Id.
175
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two-thirds are elected on a closed party list basis, whereby voters select
177
parties instead of individual candidates.
Candidates elected on a
plurality basis have a heightened incentive to personally differentiate
178
which is accomplished more
themselves from their competitors,
easily with the help of campaign contributions and expenditures. In
contrast, candidates elected on a closed party-list basis do not have the
same incentive to personally differentiate themselves from their
179
and thus, candidates elected on such a basis are
competitors,
presumably less incentivized to seek campaign financing. As a result,
the existence of a mixed system, whereby two-thirds of the legislators
are elected on a closed party list basis, may mitigate the previously
180
mentioned causes of an increased demand for campaign financing.
However, the ten-member committee tasked with making
recommendations for amendments to the 2012 Constitution has
proposed returning to the plurality system for Egypt’s next
181
parliamentary elections.
Even if this proposal is not accepted by the
larger committee and the mixed system remains in place, the mixed
system’s potential mitigating effect does not apply to the one-third of
Gamal Essam El-Din, Egypt’s Shura Council Approves New House
of Representatives Law, AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/69038/Egypt/Politics/Egypts-Shura-Council-approves-new-House-of-Represe.aspx.
178
See Daniel W. Gingerich, Ballot Structure, Political Corruption and
the Performance of Proportional Representation, 21(4) J. OF
THEORETICAL POL. 509, 512 (2009) (describing how candidates in
closed party list systems have fewer incentives to differentiate
themselves from their opponents); see also The Carter Center, supra
note 95, at 25 (“Different electoral systems promote different types of
representation and political behaviors that influence the performance
and focus of an elected assembly.”).
179
See Gingerich, supra note 178, at 512.
180
Although a closed party list system might mitigate demand for
campaign financing, scholars have reached different conclusions as to
whether closed party lists systems are preferable to plurality systems
(or open party list systems) with respect to the prevention of illegal
forms of corruption. See id. at 511-14.
181
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 20 Aug. 2013, art. 191,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2013.08.20__proposed_changes_to_2012_constitution_expert_committee_idea_eng
lish.pdf; Sabry, supra note 150.
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legislators who will be running independent of the party system. For
these legislators, the causes of increased demand for campaign
financing are unmitigated.
Unfortunately, Egypt lacks a comprehensive framework for
regulating campaign financing with respect to independent candidates
182
in parliamentary elections.
Thus, the country does not currently
have the tools to preempt a rise in unconventional corruption. The
most problematic aspect of this situation is that Egypt’s laws pertaining
to campaign finance do not include any disclosure requirements for
183
parties or candidates.
Egypt’s current campaign finance rules for
184
lower house elections can be found in Law 38 of 1972.
Besides
lacking disclosure requirements, Law 38 also lacks any meaningful
restrictions on domestic campaign contributions or independent
185
expenditures by private parties.
Instead, Article 11 of Law 38
restricts the expenditures of the candidates themselves; candidates must
comply with a specific ceiling for expenditures that is set for each

Rabab Fayad, Egypt Going to Elections, COMMON GROUND NEWS
SOURCE (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=29395&lan=en&sp
=0.
183
The Carter Center, supra note 95, at 38, 71. It is still unclear
whether Article 47 of the 2012 Constitution will be used to require
candidates to make campaign finance disclosures. Article 47 states that
“[a]ccess to information, data, documents and statistics, and the
disclosure and circulation thereof, is a right guaranteed by the state, in a
manner that does not violate the sanctity of private life or the rights of
others, and that does not conflict with national security. The law
regulates the rules for filing and archiving public documents, the means
of access to information, the means of complaint when access is
refused, and the consequent accountability.” CONSTITUTION OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 47.
184
Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People’s Assembly), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiyya, 28 Sept. 1972, art. 11 (Egypt) (unofficial English
translation prepared by Democratic Reporting International). For an in
depth discussion of Law 38 of 1972, see Aziz, supra note 56, at 25-40.
185
Law No. 38 of 1972, art. 11; Hoda Youssef, Is Egypt’s Presidential
Election for Sale?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (May 18, 2012),
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/is-egyptspresidential-election-for-sale.
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election.
In essence, under the current framework, domestic private
parties are permitted to contribute and spend unlimited amounts of
money to benefit election campaigns, which, in turn, provides elected
officials with incentives for engaging in unconventional corruption,
without any way for the public to gauge the elected official’s
susceptibility to such corruption.

VII.

COMBATING A RISE IN UNCONVENTIONAL
CORRUPTION IN POST-REVOLUTION EGYPT

Unconventional corruption is not a necessary evil for a
transitioning democracy that has recently implemented measures to
combat conventional corruption. The solution, however, is not to
prohibit unconventional corruption with positive laws. Because
unconventional corruption does not involve a coordinated quid pro quo
transaction, it is rather difficult to prove in any particular instance.
Furthermore, laws prohibiting acts of unconventional corruption could
give executive branch prosecutors the means to bring trumped up
charges against political adversaries based on a subjective view of what
187
is, and what is not, in the public interest.
Instead, a more
appropriate method of combating unconventional corruption is to
provide transparency and limit the incentives for unconventional
corruption, i.e., restrict the amounts of contributions and expenditures
that private parties can make to benefit an election campaign.
The first step towards combating unconventional corruption is
to establish rules that require elected officials to periodically disclose
188
information pertaining to campaign contributions.
The public is
entitled to information pertaining to who gives money, to whom is it
189
allocated, and for what purpose.
Reports on contributions should

Law No. 38 of 1972, art. 11.
See KLITGAARD, supra note 116, at 203 (acknowledging that
anticorruption campaigns can sometimes be used to “clean up political
opponents rather than to clean up corruption”).
188
Yingling, supra note 2, at 275 (citing Paul Collier, The Bottom
Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done
About It 149 (2007)).
189
Youssef, supra note 185; Yingling, supra note 2, at 275; USAID,
Office of Democracy and Governance, Money in Politics Handbook: A
Guide to Increasing Transparency in Emerging Democracies 15 (2003),
186
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not be limited to the eyes of a government oversight body; instead, the
public should be able to access such reports without having to make
190
specific requests.
Vulnerable sections of society are often fearful of
making information requests, but if the reports are published online or
191
otherwise, then everyone can access them anonymously.
With proper disclosure rules, the voting public gains
necessary access to information that may be indicative of an elected
192
official’s tendencies to act against the public interest.
Transparency
has a curative effect on the process of campaign funding that
193
In this
diminishes the incentive for unconventional corruption.
regard, Article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, which Egypt ratified in 2005, states that each party to the
convention shall “consider taking appropriate legislative and
administrative measures . . . to enhance transparency in the funding of
candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the
194
funding of political parties.”

http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publi
cations/pdfs/pnacr223.pdf.
190
See Yingling, supra note 2, at 318 (describing the problematic
aspects of a proposed Kenyan campaign finance law that did not make
reports available to the public).
191
ANDREW PUDDEPHATT, GLOBAL PARTNERS & ASSOCIATES,
CORRUPTION IN EGYPT 20 (2012), http://www.globalpartners.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Corruption-in-Egypt-Report-newcover.pdf.
192
Yingling, supra note 2, at 275; Varol, supra note 77, at 311; Vincent
R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16
CORNELL J. OF LAW & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16 (2006); Anthony Johnstone, A
Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 437
(2012).
193
See Henning, supra note 1, at 843.
194
G.A. Res. 58/4, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Conve
ntion/08-50026_E.pdf; but see Timothy K. Kuhner, The Democracy to
Which We Are Entitled: Human Rights and the Problem of Money in
Politics, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 53-54 (2013) (recognizing the
shortcomings of Article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption).
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Disclosure rules, although necessary, are not sufficient for
195
eliminating unconventional corruption.
The influence of campaign
contributions may be independent of any amounts spent because the
influence could also depend on the credible threat of contributions or
196
expenditures to benefit the elected official’s opponent.
For example,
imagine that a wealthy business owner announced that he or she
intended to spend vast sums of money to defeat any elected official
who supported workers’ rights legislation. If an elected official learned
of the business owner’s threat and decided to change his or her position
on workers’ rights, there would be little doubt that such change was the
result of the business owner’s threat. Disclosure rules, however, would
not be able to quantify the business owner’s influence or the elected
197
official’s act of unconventional corruption.
Notably, it is in this
regard that the United States has experienced a great deal of
unconventional corruption despite its well-established disclosure
198
requirements for campaign contributions.
In order to effectively combat unconventional corruption, laws
must limit campaign contributions and independent campaign
199
expenditures in their amounts.
When contributions and expenditures
are limited, elected officials have less incentive to engage in
unconventional corruption, and the effects of unconventional
corruption are likely to be less problematic because elected officials
will need to appeal to a greater number of individuals in order to
receive significant financing. Unconventional corruption is most
detrimental to a democracy when there only a few parties making large
contributions or expenditures, as opposed to when there are many

Yingling, supra note 2, at 275; see also B. Guy Peters, PerformanceBased Accountability, in PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
COMBATING CORRUPTION 15 (2007) (“Transparency and openness are
necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, to produce accountability in the
public sector.”).
196
LESSIG, supra note 21, at 258 (citing Marcos Chamon and Ethan
Kaplan, The Iceberg Theory of Campaign Contributions 2-5 (Apr.
2007), http://people.su.se/~ekapl/jmp_final.pdf).
197
Yingling, supra note 2, at 275-76.
198
Id. at 282-302.
199
Id. at 276; see also Kuhner, supra note 194, at 88 (recommending a
limit on campaign contributions and expenditures based on a human
rights approach to money in politics).
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parties making small contributions or expenditures.
To advocate for
limits on contributions and expenditures, however, is not to advocate
that they be prohibited. In fact, it is critical that they not be prohibited,
otherwise candidates for public office who are not independently
wealthy might lack the ability to communicate their messages to their
201
constituencies.
In a similar regard, while limits on independent third-party
campaign expenditures are necessary to combat unconventional
corruption, limits on candidate expenditures (which currently exist in
Egypt) can be detrimental to the system. Poorly calculated limits on
202
candidate expenditures can have negative consequences.
Specifically, if the limits are too low, a candidate may be rendered
203
unable to effectively communicate with a constituency.
In general,
campaign finance laws should allow candidates to effectively
communicate with their constituencies, and at the same time, ensure
204
fairness and accountability to the people.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Egypt’s revolution of January 25, 2011 was fueled by a desire
to limit conventional corruption—illegal activity that has long existed
in Egypt. The country’s transition, although chaotic and tragic in some
respects, has not been void of positive developments. The 2012
Constitution, while imperfect, provides for greater restraints on power,
especially in the executive branch. As a result, with time and further
action, Egypt has an opportunity to realize a goal of the revolution and
experience a drop in conventional corruption. However, when
conventional corruption is on the decline, unconventional corruption is
likely on the rise. Fortunately, unconventional corruption is not an
inevitable side effect of progress—it can be contained. With a certain
bit of insight and courage, the people of Egypt can reform their
campaign finance system and bring forth a true democracy—one where
elected officials make decisions not for the benefit of potential political
funders, but rather, for the benefit of the people.
Yingling, supra note 2, at 276 (citing Issacharoff, supra note 19, at
133).
201
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202
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